Macroprudential Policy, Incomplete Information and Inequality: The case of Low-Income and Developing Countries

M. Rubio, D.F. Unsal | IMF

In this paper, the authors use a DSGE model to study the passive and time-varying implementation of macroprudential policy when policymakers have noisy and lagged data, as commonly observed in low-income and developing countries (LIDCs). The model features an economy with two agents; households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the borrowers in this economy and need capital as collateral to obtain loans. The macroprudential regulator uses the collateral requirement as the policy instrument. In this set-up, they compare policy performances of permanently increasing the collateral requirement (passive policy) versus a time-varying (active) policy which responds to credit developments. Results show that with perfect and timely information, an active approach is welfare superior, since it is more effective in providing financial stability with no long-run output cost.

Legal & Regulatory Environment, Banking
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